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Abstract 
Since 9/11, U.S. Muslim philanthropy has generally been framed in terms of national security 
and civil liberties. In practice, however, U.S. Muslims’ charitable giving has posed no threat to 
national security, nor has the government’s closing of some of the largest Muslim relief 
organizations after 9/11 had the chilling effect that many predicted it would have on U.S. 
Muslims’ giving. This article argues that American Muslim philanthropy post-9/11 belies 
enduring presuppositions about the alleged ‘rigidity” of Islamic norms and the alleged 
“insularity” of the U.S. Muslim community. Each of these presuppositions has yielded 
widespread misapprehensions about the nature of Muslim philanthropy in the U.S. since 9/11. 
Contrary to these misapprehensions, the actual philanthropic practice of the U.S. Muslim 
community in the post-9/11 moment highlights the polyvalence and fluidity of the public 
practice of Islam. In the fluid space of practice, American Muslims have brought together 
Islamic vocabularies of charity and American legal and sociopolitical norms regarding 
philanthropy to forge new relations across groups of varying social, religious, political, cultural, 
and economic backgrounds. 
 Keywords: American Islam, Muslim charities, zakat, “war on terror,” anti-Muslim 
sentiments, Holy Land Foundation, Benevolence International Foundation, Global Relief 
Foundation, KindHearts 
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Until recently, the study of Islam in the United States focused primarily on questions of 
assimilation and identity formation, with the aim of ascertaining how well Muslims fit into U.S. 
society. These questions were propelled by a general assumption that U.S. society and Islamic 
beliefs and practices are incongruent and thus require a special act of reconciliation worthy of 
scholarly attention.1 More recent research into the centuries-old presence of Muslims in the 
United States, however, has shown that this assumption is not historically tenable (Curtis, 2013). 
Scholars have thus begun to explore Islam as one of a number of religions practiced in America 
since colonial times. In doing so, they are complicating facile dichotomies between Islam and the 
West, modernity and tradition, and immigrant and indigenous Muslims. Rather than approaching 
the study of Muslims in the United States with such preconceived binaries, more recent 
scholarship on American Islam focuses on the lived experiences of Muslims. It explores how 
U.S. Muslims have built communities, institutions, and intellectual networks based on their 
beliefs and traditions and in relation to relevant legal, social, and political structures as well as 
the plurality of religions, cultures, races, and ethnicities in the United States. In light of this shift, 
the study of Muslim philanthropy in the United States is not only welcome but also well overdue 
as to how it focuses scholarship on how U.S. Muslims bring their religious values, their sense of 
individual and communal needs, and American social norms and political values into dialectical 
relations that cross social, political, and economic boundaries through giving.  
Distinctive Contextual Practices of Zakat in the United States 
                                                        
1 I have discussed these issues in some depth; see GhaneaBassiri (2010, 4f). 
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Given that zakat, one of the pillars of Islam, enshrines charity as a divinely ordained duty, 
and given that voluntary giving in the forms of sadaqa (meritorious giving to the needy) and 
waqf (pious endowment) have a long and significant history in Muslim-majority societies, the 
relative dearth of scholarly analyses of Muslim philanthropy gives reason for pause.2 Is charity 
such a ubiquitous Muslim practice that scholars have taken it for granted? Is it so pervasive that 
it has not required systematic study? In tackling these questions, I focus on the scholarship on 
Islam in the United States, and I use philanthropy and charity interchangeably while recognizing 
that most scholars of philanthropy do not consider the two synonymous. As Robert Payton and 
Michael Moody explain, philanthropy differs from charity in that it aims to make systematic 
changes “to improve the quality of life” of people less fortunate whereas charity works “to 
relieve suffering” that results from an immediate need (Payton & Moody, 2008, p. 38). This 
distinction, however, does not map directly onto Islamic practices of zakat, sadaqa, and waqf. It 
is important to be mindful of them so as not to indiscriminately map onto Islam academic notions 
of charity rooted in nongovernmental organizations and Christian understandings of charity.  
As religious acts subject to God’s judgment, zakat, sadaqa, and waqf could be employed 
to both improve quality of life and relieve suffering, depending on one’s interpretation of what 
constitutes a need that demands a religious response. In the case of zakat—traditionally 
construed as a divinely ordained obligation to give a specified percentage of one’s wealth to 
                                                        
2 Some noteworthy studies of Muslim charity and philanthropy include Sabra (2000); 
Bonner, Ener, and Singer (2003); Singer (2008) and Amelia (2013). For Muslim philanthropy in 
America, see Siddiqui (2013) and Siddiqui (2010). 
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specific groups—another important consideration is whether or not other Muslims, particularly 
legal scholars (ulama) who strive to interpret God’s will for humanity, would also consider one’s 
choice of charitable giving as fulfilling God’s command. This question has come up for many 
U.S. Muslims in relation to contributions to nonprofit organizations that advocate for Muslim 
rights, particularly in the aftermath of 9/11. Do these contributions fulfill zakat obligations 
according to Islamic law? To address this concern, Muslim rights organizations have asked 
Muslim scholars for their learned opinions (fatawa). The Council on American-Islamic Relations 
(CAIR), for example, cites an opinion by Sheikh Ahmad Kutty from the Islamic Institute of 
Toronto and asserts that  
[n]umerous Muslim scholars have confirmed that Zakat is payable to 
organizations that exist to serve the Muslim community by protecting their rights. 
This is because work done by CAIR (and other such organizations) can be 
classified as fi-sabilillah [“in the path of God”], which is one of the eight 
categories of Zakat recipients detailed in the Quran (Chapter 9, Verse 60)” 
(emphasis theirs). (Council on American-Islamic Relations, 2015) 
Thus, in the contemporary context of rising anti-Muslim sentiment where Muslims fear 
for their civil rights, zakat could be employed not only to alleviate an immediate need but also to 
effect systematic change in people’s lives. Similar questions are raised about whether or not 
zakat could be used to build mosques or Islamic schools in the United States, and in each case 
individual Muslims answer these questions based on a combination of their personal 
understanding of what God demands of them, what Muslim scholars say about the matter, and 
the laws and customs of their local community.  
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In other cases, we find U.S. Muslims giving, not because they are trying to alleviate a 
need, but because they deem the act of giving meritorious in the eyes of God. One of the clearest 
and earliest examples of this occurs among Muslim slaves who, in the nineteenth century, 
distributed saraka3 in the form of small cakes to children on plantations off the coast of Georgia. 
This act was both frequent and memorable enough that decades later, in the 1930s, their 
grandchildren recounted the rituals surrounding its distribution to ethnographers of the Works 
Progress Administration (WPA). Shad Hall, for example, recalled that his grandmother, Hestuh,  
make strange cake, fus ub ebry munt. She call it “saraka.” She make it out uh 
meal an honey. She put meal in bilin watuh an take it right out. Den she mix it 
wid honey, and make it in flat cakes. Sometimes she make it out uh rice. Duh 
cake made, she call us all in an deah she hab great big fannuh full an she gib us 
each cake. Den we all stands roun table, and she says, “Ameen, Ameen, Ameen,” 
an we all eats cake (Granger, 1940, p. 159). 
In the antebellum South, where slaves were stripped of any wealth as well as ancestral 
and religious ties, the distribution of saraka cakes became a means of entering into communal 
relations through a praiseworthy act in Islam rather than a form of charitable donation to the 
                                                        
3 According to Sylviane Diouf, saraka was the pronunciation of the Arabic word sadaqa 
used by the Malinke of Guinea and the Hausa of Nigeria, and members of both of these ethnic 
groups were found among slaves on the plantations of the Georgia Sea Islands. See Diouf (1999, 
p. 27). 
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needy.4 This distinctive practice of saraka among West African Muslims enslaved in the United 
States is similar to instances of the practice of nadhr found in many Muslim-majority societies. 
Nadhr is a personal vow to fulfill a pious act in exchange for God or a saint fulfilling one’s 
supplication. It often involves the distribution of food to the poor or to visitors to a shrine.5 
Although those who practice nadhr often vow to perform a charitable act involving food, their 
primary objective in taking such a vow is not necessarily charity. Rather, it is to receive divine 
assistance. 
The preceding examples demonstrate how deeply charity and philanthropy are embedded 
in Islam and Muslim societies, but also how Islamic notions of zakat, sadaqa, nadhr, and waqf 
have distinct connotations and social implications that are not always in accord with notions of 
service, voluntarism, and the public good commonly associated with philanthropy. The 
characterization of philanthropy in the contemporary United States as other-directed, voluntary, 
and for the public good has its roots in Christian notions of caritas, or selfless love of others, 
from which the English word “charity” is derived. In Islam, zakat may be self-regulated and 
require sacrificing one’s wealth, but its purpose is not defined by voluntarism. It is a religious 
obligation that is subject to divine reward and punishment. Though nadhr is a vow to perform a 
pious act often involving charity, it is not obligatory, nor is it necessarily selfless. There are also 
times when sadaqa is performed as a meritorious act in and of itself regardless of whether it 
                                                        
4 For an excellent discussion of communal dimensions of sadaqa in West Africa, see 
Launay (1992, pp. 211–218). 
5 See Singer (2008, p. 76) for a discussion of nazr in Afghanistan. 
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actually alleviates a need or contributes to the public good. Waqfs are endowments that support 
institutions for what may be typically construed as the charitable and religious purposes 
associated with Western concepts of philanthropy. But they also serve as financial trusts through 
which patrons could shelter their wealth and assure the financial security of their own families or 
loved ones. This is usually done by stipulating a salary for members of one’s family from the 
waqf in exchange for their management of the assets associated with it. Although subject to 
abuse, the fact that the family waqf, or al-waqf al-ahli, is designed for the benefit of kin makes it 
no less an act of charitable giving by traditional Islamic norms. Indeed, one of the “attributes” 
(sifat) that classically qualifies a group to receive zakat is that its members be among one’s 
familial relations.6 In sum, although the nature and telos of each of these Islamic practices of 
giving vary, they all function in establishing relations between different individuals and social 
groups.  
The Polyvalence of Muslim Practices of Giving 
By calling attention to these distinctive implications of charity in Islam, I do not mean to 
suggest that Muslim philanthropists do not value altruism, voluntarism, or the public good. Quite 
the contrary. In fact, there is no doubt that these values have played an influential role in how 
Muslims have decided to pay zakat, give sadaqa, make nadhr, or establish waqfs. I also do not 
intend to revive the unhelpful dichotomy between Islam and the West by juxtaposing so-called 
                                                        
6 Abu Hamid al-Ghazali, for example, enumerates as his “sixth quality” of the proper 
recipients of zakat: “that they be among one’s close relatives or distant kin” (an yakuna min al-
aqarib wa dhawi l-arham). See al-Ghazali (1405 AH/1982 CE, p. 95). 
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“Islamic” and so-called “American” conceptions of charity. It goes without saying that, in 
practice, not all instances of non-Muslim philanthropy in the United States are other-directed, 
voluntary, and for the public good. Rather, by highlighting the distinct colorings of philanthropy 
in Islam, I hope to illustrate that, although most Muslims agree that charity is a divinely ordained 
obligation, there is no single Islamic conception of charity or philanthropy. At the risk of stating 
the obvious, the critical point here is that Muslims interpret Islamic values differently, and it is 
these differences that have made charity a polyvalent practice in the innumerable and varied 
social contexts of Muslim life.  
Unfortunately, the polyvalence of Muslim identity and practice, albeit colorfully visible 
in cultural expressions, has generally been muted in public discourses on Islam. Such discourses, 
even among Muslims themselves, rarely conceptualize Islam as a dynamic tradition through 
which Muslims attempt to address an entire spectrum of challenges—especially those posed by 
modernity—as do their non-Muslim counterparts in the “West.” According to this view of Islam 
and modernity, because nearly all Muslim-majority societies in the modern era came under some 
sort of political or economic subjugation at the hand of European empires, most Muslims were 
introduced to the political, technological, and scientific advances associated with modernity at 
the same time as Muslim states lost political autonomy. Consequently, public discourses on 
Islam have generally conceived of modernity as a problem for Muslims, and students of Islam 
have generally concerned themselves with how Muslim elites have addressed the question of 
Euro-American dominance in the world while overlooking the religious question of how 
Muslims have interpreted Islam in their daily lives. Questions, for example, about how 
individuals practiced charity or paid zakat under colonial rule or in post-colonial nation-states 
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have not been deemed as important as questions surrounding the rise of so-called Islamist 
movements in the modern era.  
This neglect of everyday religious practices has been further sustained by the widespread 
notion that there is no distinction between religion and politics in Islam as there is in secular 
modernity. Because the prophet Muhammad b. ‘Abd Allah (d. c. 11/632) founded both a religion 
and a polity through his teachings, it has generally been assumed that Muslim political and 
religious history are one and the same. This notion has been so widespread that in his influential 
book Islam in Modern History, Wilfred Cantwell Smith felt it necessary to offer a lengthy 
defense of his approach to Islam as a “faith.” He argued that Islam not only shapes social and 
political institutions but also affects an individual’s worldview and personal relation to God 
(Smith, 1957, pp. 7–12). However, despite challenging conventional approaches to Islamic 
history as the history of Muslim politics by focusing on Islam as a “faith,” even Wilfred 
Cantwell Smith associated modernity with a “very serious decline” in Islam and attributed this 
decline to Muslims’ loss of military and political power to European states. He wrote that, at the 
onset of the modern era,  
Muslim society was losing its once firm, proud grip on the world. Moreover, it so 
happened that this degeneration coincided with the exuberance of Europe. At 
about this time Western civilization was launching forth on the greatest upsurge 
of expansive energy that human history has ever seen. Vitality, skill, and power 
vastly accumulated. With them the West was presently reshaping its own life and 
soon the life of all the world. This new giant, striding forth in exploratory 
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restlessness, met the Muslim world and found its own growing might confronted 
with growing infirmity (Smith, 1957, p. 38). 
One of the consequences of conceptualizing modernity as a political crisis for Muslims 
has been that, up until recently, scholarship on modern Islam did not focus on Muslims as 
creative agents engaging modernity on their own terms. Rather, as Smith’s quote illustrates, it 
focused on Muslims as subjects who reacted to a world shaped by a politically and militarily 
dominant Euro-American culture, commonly referred to as “the West.”7 This view of Muslims 
shaped the study of Islam in the United States and has led many scholars to look for sources of 
friction in U.S. Muslim experiences, rather than seeing Muslims as one of the many agentive 
participants in a religiously, culturally, and racially diverse America. From such a politicized 
vantage point, quotidian activities associated with Islamic practices such as prayer, fasting, and 
charity were rendered invisible despite their immense importance in orienting Muslims spatially, 
temporally, and socially.  
Rendering Muslim Giving Academically Invisible 
The field of comparative religion furnished another set of blinders to the practice of Islam 
in the latter half of the twentieth century through its operative premise that homo religiosus was 
                                                        
7 I should note that Smith was one of the early critics of the notion that Islam is “inert, the 
passive recipient of [Western] influence.” Nonetheless, as the above quote demonstrates, he did 
not see Muslims as participants in the making of a modern world. Rather he saw the “thrust of 
Islam in this situation” in “the dynamics of its reaction . . . to the modern world” (1957, p. 14, 
emphasis mine). 
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the only religious subject of any sociological or historical import in an increasingly rationalistic 
world.8 The comparative study of religion through the lens of homo religiosus reduced religions 
to the experience of the “sacred.” It operated under the assumption that as empirical reasoning 
became the basis of modern social, economic, and political structures, the study of institutions 
and rituals based on religious notions of the supernatural was of secondary importance to 
individual’s private experiences of the transcendent. The former was seen to conflict with 
modernity, whereas the latter was believed to accommodate it by rendering the religious to the 
private realm. Religious differences embodied in institutions, customs, laws, and rituals were 
seen as derivatives of manifestations of the sacred experienced by humans, which could be best 
understood symbolically rather than through history and social scientific study. From this point 
of view, the only religion that mattered was the one based on an internal feeling or experience of 
the sacred. Thus the social and political embodiment of religion in institutions and rituals as well 
as in social concepts such as race, gender, and class were pushed out of sight. They were 
replaced by a sacred-profane binary that regarded the physical and the socio-historical as profane 
or “unreal” and defined the sacred or “the real” in terms of an immanent and eternal self-
                                                        
8 The most notable and influential proponent of this idea in the United States was Mircea 
Eliade. See in particular The Sacred and the Profane (1959) in which he builds on the 
controversial tradition of Rudolf Otto’s attempt (Otto, 1917/2010) to articulate sui generis 
categories for what ironically was intended to be a non-reductionist critical study of religious 
experience in the context of the modern Western academy. 
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manifestation of the divine, which homo religiosus experienced internally and secondarily 
expressed symbolically through religious texts and rites.9    
In this view of religion, which remains enormously influential in American culture 
despite numerous critiques from within the academy,10 charity was not considered a significant 
act in and of itself but a positive, outward consequence of internal religious sentiments. William 
James famously defined it in Varieties of Religious Experience as “a usual fruit of saintliness,” 
(James, 1902, p. 306) or more specifically, as one of the “practical consequences” of a 
“fundamental inner condition,” which he described as “a shifting of the emotional centre towards 
loving and harmonious affections” toward others (pp. 299–300). Feelings, which following 
liberal theological understandings of charity, he asserted, “follow logically from the assurance of 
God’s friendly presence, the notion of our brotherhood as men being an immediate inference 
from that of God’s fatherhood of us all” (p. 306). In other words, James explained that charity is 
an “organic consequence” of faith or a feeling of being in unity with something greater than 
oneself that fosters happiness, sympathy, and kindness in individuals, a form of other-directed 
“healthy-mindedness . . . which looks on all things and sees that they are good” (pp. 101, 307).  
                                                        
9 In the latter half of the twentieth century, in addition to Mircea Eliade, these ideas were 
popularized in the United States through the works of scholars such as Joseph Campbell, Seyyed 
Hossein Nasr, and Huston Smith.  
10 By way of example, see Smith (1987); Wasserstrom (1999); McCutcheon (1997); 
Shaw 1995) and Fitzgerald (2003). 
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James identified religious interiority that resulted in healthy-mindedness as “genuine 
religion.” Genuine religion fostered individual happiness, but James was too much of an 
empiricist and too careful of a scholar to whitewash all religion as happy. He also realized that 
religious people do bad things and are often unhappy. He argued,  
The basenesses so commonly charged to religion’s account are thus, almost all of 
them, not chargeable at all to religion proper, but rather to religion’s wicked 
practical partner, the spirit of corporate dominion. And the bigotries are most of 
them in their turn chargeable to religion’s wicked intellectual partner, the spirit of 
dogmatic dominion, the passion for laying down the law in the form of an 
absolutely closed-in theoretic system. The ecclesiastical spirit in general is the 
sum of these two spirits of dominion. (James, 1902, p. 370) 
He went on to beseech his reader not to confuse the “tribal or corporate psychology” 
presented by the church with “the purely interior life,” which he defined as religion (p. 370). 
More recently, the popular New York Times columnist David Brooks evoked William 
James’s Varieties of Religious Experiences to argue that President Obama “is clearly wrong 
when he refuses to use the word ‘Islam’ in reference to Islamist terrorism.” In deciding whether 
or not to call acts of political violence undertaken by certain individual Muslims “Islamic,” 
Brooks argued that it is useful to keep in mind the distinction James made between “genuine 
religion” and its “wicked practical partner, the spirit of corporate dominion.” According to 
Brooks, James’s work clarifies “the core of our confusion . . . about what a religion is” (Brooks, 
2016). Shadowing the association of religion with interiority in the early study of comparative 
religion, Brooks explains, 
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It seems blindly obvious to say, but the spirit of religion begins with a sense that 
God exists . . . and out of that flows a set of values and experiences: prayer, 
praise, charity, contrition, grace and the desire to grow closer toward holiness. . . . 
The spirit of dominion . . . does not start with an awareness of God. It starts with a 
sense of injury and a desire to heal injury through revenge and dominion. 
(Brooks, 2016, p. A29) 
In other words, the terrorist’s religion is not “healthy-minded.” For Brooks, such 
“religion” associates injury with “some external enemy . . . rather than internal weakness.” And 
at this point, political ideology enters into religion and “gives the injured a course of action that 
will make them feel grandiose and heroic” (Brooks, 2016). From this, it logically follows that 
insofar as one could detect “the spirit of dogmatic dominion, [and] the passion for laying down 
the law” among even a few Muslims, violent acts carried out by groups like al-Qaeda or the 
Islamic State may justifiably be called “Islamic,” even though they cannot be called “genuinely 
religious.”  
It is important to note that in making his argument, Brooks did not concern himself with 
what Muslim practices reveal about religion. He did not inquire into the voluminous discourses 
in the Islamic tradition about violence, happiness, charity, God, or divine union. His concern, as 
well as the concern of most of his readers, was to explain how Islam fits into the prevailing idea 
that “good religion” is essentially an internal experience of the sacred that reconciles the 
individual with the sociopolitical and economic structures that impede their happiness. Indeed, in 
the contemporary United States, to the extent that Islam does not fit comfortably into this 
conception of religion—a conception that effectively defines “good” religion as one that 
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accommodates, and even defers to, the power of the sovereign secular nation-state—it has been 
pathologized. It is thus no wonder that more energy and time have been spent identifying the 
pathologies of Islam in the modern era than examining how millions of Muslims practice their 
religion. 
Pathologizing Muslim Philanthropy as Politically Subversive 
A telling example of pathologizing approaches to Islam in discussions of Muslim 
philanthropy after 9/11 is found in J. Millar Burr and Robert O. Collins’s (2006) Alms for Jihad:  
In [“Western”] Christian countries institutions seeking financial support for charitable 
activities have discreetly segregated the secular from the religious, reflecting the historic 
separation of church and state. . . . In contrast, Islam does not distinguish between church 
and state. Muslims who are obligated to perform zakat and individual donors make no 
distinction between the secular and religious uses to which their donations may be 
employed. That allows those who administer Islamic charities a great deal of latitude as 
to how the money is spent and for what purpose. (Burr & Collins, 2006, pp. 6–7) 
The specific purpose that Burr and Collins have in mind is religious militancy and 
terrorism, and they rely on above-discussed preconceptions to identify its pathology in Islam. 
They further rely on their readers sharing in the facile assumption that religion and politics are 
one and the same in Islam and that, historically, while so-called Christian societies modernized, 
Muslim-majority societies stuck to tradition. Their pathologizing approach to Islam results in 
their identification of a doctrinal Muslim practice, zakat, as a possibly nefarious source of 
funding for terrorism, irrespective of the way individual Muslims decide to practice zakat. From 
such a dubious perspective, all acts of Muslim charity are suspect. Either Muslims naively fulfill 
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an obligation that terrorists could then hijack for their own purposes or they knowingly 
contribute to militant causes in the name of charity because they do not make a distinction 
between religion and politics. Whichever of these views one takes, neither recognizes the 
creative agency exercised by Muslims as they attempt to critically engage their sociopolitical 
circumstances through charitable giving.  
This pathologizing approach to Islam also informed the U.S. government’s early 
reactions to the attacks of 9/11. A few days after the attacks, President George W. Bush ordered 
the Treasury Department to freeze the assets of 27 not-for-profit entities that the government 
considered to be “fronts for terrorism.” Among these were the three largest U.S. Muslim relief 
organizations: the Holy Land Foundation for Relief and Development, the Global Relief 
Foundation, and the Benevolence International Foundation. “Just to show you how insidious 
these terrorists are,” President Bush warned U.S. Americans, “they often times use nice-
sounding, non-governmental organizations as fronts for their activities.” He went on to explain 
that the government had “targeted” this pathological use of charity and was working to freeze 
and block the use of their assets both in the United States and abroad (Bureau of Public Affairs 
Department of State, 2001). The decision to freeze the assets of three of the largest Muslim 
charities in the United States rather than require them to demonstrate unequivocally the legal use 
of their donations for charitable purposes is a telling sign of the depth and consequences of the 
pathologizing approaches toward Islam that are still pervasive today. The targeted Muslim 
charities were treated as monolithic entities and stigmatized as sources of contagion that needed 
to be contained, rather than as civic institutions of sociopolitical agents subject to their national 
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context and donor base—agents who could respond dynamically to changing circumstances and 
government regulations. 
Another telling sign of the depth and consequence of pathologizing approaches to Islam 
after 9/11 was present in the treatment of the remittances U.S. Muslims of immigrant 
backgrounds sent to friends and families in their native lands. Similar to their non-Muslim 
counterparts, most Muslim immigrants came to the United States in search of what they hoped 
would be a better life. Because many of them have achieved relative success, they have felt an 
obligation to help their less fortunate family members and friends “back home.” Because some 
of these Muslim immigrants are from countries that are impoverished or in political turmoil 
(oftentimes a primary reason for their emigration to the United States), their family and friends 
do not always have easy access to the international banking system. For this reason, like many 
non-Muslim immigrants from similar backgrounds, they rely on informal financial networks to 
remit money to support loved ones in their native countries (GhaneaBassiri, 2010, pp. 166–167). 
This common practice among immigrants from poor or politically unstable countries, however, 
was painted negatively in the media and state discourses as a “Muslim” practice susceptible to 
nefarious use. This was done by referring to it by its Arabic name11 as hawala rather than simply 
                                                        
11 This is a subtle but highly effective strategy for “othering” Muslim instances of a 
practice undertaken by countless non-Muslim citizens from immigrant backgrounds—most 
notably Mexican Americans.  
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as “remittances,” thus obfuscating its purpose and bringing suspicion to anyone associated with 
it.12 
Interpreting Zakat in Response to State Pressure 
It is noteworthy that U.S. Muslim activists did not initially respond to the government’s 
targeting of international Muslim relief efforts by portraying themselves as victims of the 
political system. They depicted the government’s actions as a by-product of the public’s 
ignorance of Muslim practices and Islamic values and, in some cases, of “Zionist” opposition to 
Muslim political interests (Ameri, 2004). In general, they regarded the U.S. political system as 
fair and subject to change (Skerry, 2006). They saw themselves as one of the latest links at the 
end of a long chain of minority civil rights struggles in U.S. history. They insisted that 
“American and Islamic values can intertwine,” and that U.S. Muslims should see it as their civic 
and Islamic responsibility to use their unique “opportunities of freedom and success to help the 
needy and poor in the United States and other countries” (Ameri, 2004). 
This interpretation of the government’s actions toward Muslim charitable giving did not 
directly challenge the pathologizing of Islamic beliefs and practices as potentially subversive, 
though it did enable Muslim activists to engage government officials on familiar grounds. 
Whether this was a case of political pragmatism or an instance of self-disciplining in the face of 
                                                        
12 For examples of media reports on hawala shortly after 9/11, see Girth and Miller 
(2001); Day (2001); McKinnon, Chorney, and Carnig (2001); and Frantz (2001). For an example 
for governmental discussion of hawala in relation to terrorism, see Jost and Sandhu (2000). Also 
see Burr and Collins (2006, pp. 71–75). 
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state power is debatable. What is clear is that—for at least a few years after 9/11, when 
government officials and the public more generally looked to Islam through the lens of 
pathology, and especially “terrorism,” and deemed Muslim charitable giving suspect—most 
leading U.S. Muslim organizations did little to challenge the state’s logic. Rather, they sought to 
work with the government by asking the Treasury Department to clarify its conception of what 
constituted sound charitable practices. U.S. Muslim activists organized nationally to urge the 
government to put together a list of Muslim charities to which Muslims could donate without 
worrying about the government confiscating their donations or worrying that they themselves 
might become a target of the state (Al-Marayati, 2004). They also asked the Treasury 
Department to issue guidelines based on which Muslim charities could operate securely and thus 
assure that their donations would not end up in a government-frozen account, or in the pockets of 
pricey lawyers (Ameri, 2004). The Holy Land Foundation had even approached government 
officials prior to 9/11 for help in complying with the law, but was rebuffed (Turner, 2009). 
KindHearts reported that, in December 2003, it formally appealed to testify before the Senate 
Finance Committee to explain its activities and the transparency of their finances. They did not 
receive a reply and had their funds frozen in February 2006 (Bafaquih, 2006).  
Overtime, the government’s reluctance to provide concrete guidance13 or to directly 
engage with Muslim leaders became an impetus for activists to challenge the logic of its actions. 
                                                        
13 As I discuss below, the government did respond to these requests by issuing broad 
voluntary guidelines that international charities and foundations found too general to be 
applicable.  
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They argued that they faced a “fishing expedition” or “witch-hunt” that unconstitutionally 
expanded the powers of the government and impinged on Muslims’ rights to free exercise of 
their religion (Al-Marayati, 2004). Noted U.S. Muslim lawyer and scholar of international 
human rights law, M. Cherif Bassiouni, called the government’s actions an “assault upon 
constitutional freedoms under the guise of terrorist-related prosecutions” and a “fear-mongering 
campaign . . . supported by avowedly anti-Muslim groups” (Bassiouni, 2008). There was a 
general sense among U.S. Muslim activists specifically, and civil rights groups more generally, 
that  
[t]he government’s actions have created a climate of fear that chills American 
Muslims’ free and full exercise of their religion through charitable giving, or 
Zakat, one of the ‘five pillars’ of Islam and a religious obligation for all observant 
Muslims.” (Turner, 2009, p. 6) 
Not unlike earlier responses to the closing of Muslim charities—responses which did not 
directly challenge the logic of state power and were presented in the familiar bureaucratic 
language of U.S. political culture—later civil rights arguments against state overreach were also 
presented in terms of political values and presuppositions about Islam and religion that were 
familiar to the public. This point is illustrated in the 2008–2009 interviews with select U.S. 
Muslims that the American Civil Liberties Union cited to proffer evidence of the chilling effect 
the government’s actions have had on the free exercise of religion. 
I feel this is part of my religion, part of my faith: that I have to help through 
donation, to needy people in Palestine or Bangladesh, people living in war or 
occupation, people suffering a disaster like an earthquake. Now I can’t make 
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donations—it’s clear to everybody you can’t give to Muslim charities. . . . Since 
HLF [the Holy Land Foundation] was closed, now there is no way to give in a 
way that is clearly legal. We don’t know how to give now, and there is no way to 
give Zakat now. . . . Right now I am not giving, I have halted my Zakat, and this 
means I am not complying with my religion. Even international law says I can 
help people in need according to my religion. (Turner, 2009, p. 89) 
Before I was giving to any Muslim charities that help the Muslim 
community, if it was a humanitarian organization. There were a couple of good 
ones, but the government shut them down and named them terrorist organizations. 
Now we are scared to give to any. After what we’re seeing from the Bush 
administration, and too many innocent donors being questioned, I just stopped. 
I’m not giving anymore. (Turner 2009, p. 91) 
While it is understandable that a Muslim who donates to international Muslim relief 
organizations may fear doing so after the government precipitately shuttered some of them for 
allegedly supporting terrorism, it is not at all clear why these actions would impede Muslims 
from fulfilling the obligation of zakat by giving to the needy in general. After all, needy Muslims 
did not suddenly disappear from the United States. Couldn’t U.S. Muslims personally find needy 
individuals or charitable causes for their zakat? This is, in fact, a technical possibility in Islamic 
law, which recognizes the right of a legitimate Muslim ruler to collect and distribute zakat 
according to Islamic law but does not release individuals from the obligation of zakat in the 
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absence of such a ruler, permitting them to pay zakat directly to the needy or to another 
organization that could be trusted to distribute it properly.14  
Now, given that individual Muslims can technically distribute their own zakat money to 
the needy, it seems safe to assume that those who argued that the government’s closing of 
Muslim charities created “a climate of fear” that “made it impossible for [Muslims] to fulfill 
their religious obligation” (Turner, 2009, p. 9) did so with its political effects in mind; they 
sought to protect U.S. Muslims from state intimidation. Furthermore, they argued within a 
conceptual framework more resonant with U.S. legal and civic discourses than with Islamic law. 
As such, they indirectly re-inscribed presuppositions about the inflexibility and doctrinaire nature 
of Islam as well as about the essentially private nature of religion. Consequently, clunky 
arguments were put forth that made little sense in terms of the normative practices of charity in 
Islam, which in fact afford Muslims measured flexibility in giving their zakat, but were perfectly 
sensible in the political culture of the United States and its paradoxical understandings of Islam 
as rigidly zealous and of religion as interiorized and private. 
For six years I really have not been able to fulfill Zakat. . . . HLF was in the news 
and they painted all the Muslim charities with a very broad brush; for a very long 
time we haven’t known what charity we could trust to give to. . . . It is an 
obligation we have as a Muslim: you have to pray, you have to go on Hajj, and 
you have to give Zakat if you can afford it. This is all part of being a Muslim, and 
                                                        
14 The history and legal opinions surrounding zakat payments are complicated and vary 
by region and era. For a learned overview, see Singer (2008, pp. 44–62). 
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we absolutely have not been able to practice our religion to the extent we are 
obligated to do so. This is why the Pilgrims sailed here, for religious freedom. I 
don’t have any religious rights anymore; I ask am I living in America? It is 
disheartening, disappointing. I feel that I sinned. (Turner, 2009, p. 14) 
Another interviewee, echoing William James’s association of charity with healthy-
minded spirituality, argued, “Closing down the charities, you are getting to the spiritual essence 
of the human being. Every person needs to give to charities as a religious obligation, to feel good 
as a person, and the government has closed this off” (Turner, 2009, p. 91). The notions that one 
cannot pay zakat if a specific set of international relief organizations are not accessible or that 
charity is related to the spiritual essence of humans may be dissonant with the notion of charity 
as a divinely ordained obligation in Islam, but they nonetheless echo American political 
sensibilities and Protestant theological understandings of freedom of conscience.  
As political scientist Peter Skerry (2006) notes, “Muslims never sound quite so American 
as when asserting their rights against government policies they consider unjust.” By interpreting 
Islamic practices in the language of U.S. democratic values, U.S. Muslim activists gained a 
partial hearing from both the non-Muslim public and government officials. Writing in The 
Chronicle of Philanthropy, the executive director of the Ohio Association of Nonprofit 
Organizations admonished the industry for its “silence” on Muslim charities:  
The implications for Muslim charities are already being felt and are disturbing. 
No list of “clean” organizations—those organization not under governmental 
investigation—exists, creating a chilling effect on donations to all Muslim 
organizations, especially those that work overseas. . . . It may not be appropriate 
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to express outright support for the Muslim organizations that have been shut down 
as part of the government’s war on terrorism, but America’s nonprofit leaders 
should be paying attention, and should express some concern about the issues of 
due process, accountability, and fair treatment raised by these cases. (Moyers, 
2002) 
The Department of Treasury sought to respond to these concerns expressed by U.S. 
Muslim activists and industry leaders by issuing in 2002 a set of voluntary “anti-terrorist 
financing guidelines” for U.S.-based charities. Charities and foundations, however, criticized 
these guidelines because of the heavy investigative burden they placed on charities and 
foundations. The guidelines required charitable organizations to collect a broad range of 
information on the financial practices and accounts of their grantees (Council on Foundations, 
2003). Later in 2004, the Treasury Department asked charities and foundations for advice on 
drafting voluntary guidelines for U.S.-based charities. This process led to a revised set of 
guidelines issued in 2005 (Williams, 2004). In June 2004, the Treasury also appointed Mahmoud 
el-Gamal, a professor of economics at Rice University, as the first Islamic Finance Scholar-in-
Residence to assist it with better understanding Islamic financial practices (Reuters, 2004). The 
Obama administration advanced efforts to work with domestic Muslim organizations. In his 
widely publicized 2009 Cairo University speech to the global Muslim community, President 
Obama validated U.S. Muslim activists’ concerns about the consequences of the government’s 
treatment of Muslim charities for Muslim civil and political rights and responded to their request 
for collaborations: 
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Freedom of religion is central to the ability of peoples to live together. . . . For 
instance, in the United States, rules on charitable giving have made it harder for 
Muslims to fulfill their religious obligation. That’s why I’m committed to 
working with American Muslims to ensure that they can fulfill zakat. (Obama, 
2009)  
A New Dialectic: Flourishing between Alienation and Resistance 
Those who pathologized Islam targeted Muslim charities with the stated intent to contain 
the threat of terrorism. Meanwhile, those concerned about civil rights saw contagious symptoms 
of government overreach in the fear American Muslims felt after 9/11. Although these two 
camps often stood in political opposition, both politicized American Muslim philanthropy and 
further contributed to the highly problematic securitization of U.S. Muslim identity15 by framing 
the government’s actions against Muslim charities in terms of balancing national security with 
religious freedom. This framing of Muslim charitable giving as a problem for U.S. Americans’ 
security and liberty does not reflect the reality of U.S. Muslim philanthropy post-9/11, but there 
is no denying that it has had real consequences by securitizing international relief work in the 
United States and bringing U.S. Muslim activists into conversation with the state as 
intermediaries who could help balance the presumed conflict between national security and 
religious liberty.  
Muslim philanthropy in the United States after 9/11 belies Muslim charity as a problem 
for security and liberty.  On the whole, U.S. Muslims never stopped giving to charity in response 
                                                        
15 For a discussion of this issue, see Mandaville (2013) and Fox and Akbaba (2015). 
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to the government’s investigation and prosecution of the largest U.S. Muslim international relief 
organizations. In reality, U.S. Muslims gave in larger numbers and diversified their donations by 
giving to non-Muslim charities and rights organizations, to local U.S. Muslim non-profit 
organizations, and to smaller regional charities in their home countries. U.S. Muslim 
philanthropists donated to universities to establish chairs and centers for Islamic Studies.16 The 
annual budget of the Chicago-based Inner-City Muslim Action Network (IMAN), which fights 
poverty and other forms of structural injustices in inner-city neighborhoods, increased from 
$200,000 to $2 million after 9/11. More U.S. Muslim philanthropic dollars also went to Muslim 
rights organizations. Donations for the construction of mosques, Islamic schools, and community 
centers increased (Hartman, 2011). Donations to major relief organizations also never ceased. In 
fact, they seem to have increased significantly. As Shariq Siddiqui’s (2013) research has shown, 
charitable giving to the 14 largest American Muslim relief organizations “rose from a little more 
than $29 million in 2002 to more than $96 million in 2008.” 
And despite its drawbacks, framing Muslim charity in the language of national security 
and religious freedom resulted in the securitization of U.S. Muslim charities and led U.S. Muslim 
rights organizations to become conciliators between Muslim nonprofits and governmental 
bureaucracies. So what does the latent realization that, in practice, U.S. Muslims never stopped 
giving to charity reveal about the role of Muslim philanthropy in the United States? What is 
                                                        
16 A significant example of this is the Abbasi Program in Islamic Studies established at 
Stanford University (Delevett, 2003). 
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learned by focusing on the actual practice of Muslim philanthropy in the United States rather 
than its politicization by the government and U.S. Muslim activists?   
First and foremost, it is clear that the average U.S. Muslim practiced zakat according to 
the principles of Islamic law, which do not necessitate zakat to be paid to any particular 
institution. They did not stop giving zakat money to charitable causes in the face of intimidating 
state tactics. Furthermore, the select Muslims cited by the ACLU withstanding, most U.S. 
Muslims did not subjugate their obligation to pay zakat to politics; they did not stop paying zakat 
in order to proffer evidence for civil rights organizations to argue against government violations 
of U.S. Muslims’ First Amendment rights. In spite of the politicized din surrounding Muslim 
philanthropy in the United States after 9/11, the average Muslim did not lose sight of the fact that 
the needy and philanthropic causes did not disappear because of the U.S. government’s 
intimidating actions. When local exigencies prevented them from giving to certain charities, they 
fulfilled God’s command by giving to others.  
Structurally, beyond the choices made by individual Muslims about how to give to 
charity, U.S. Muslim philanthropy post-9/11 has been consonant with the general role 
philanthropy plays in the broader civil society, fulfilling needs that the state cannot or fails to 
address. A pertinent illustration of this form of U.S. Muslim philanthropy is the establishment of 
free health clinics and the contributions made toward organizations such as IMAN. Furthermore, 
by financially helping U.S. Muslims develop new support networks or strengthen existing ones, 
U.S. Muslim philanthropy has functioned as a means of resisting state policies and public 
discourses that targeted Muslims and stigmatized Islam in general. These support networks were 
bolstered by charitable donations to Muslim civil rights organizations, such as the Council on 
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American-Islamic Relations, and to community-building efforts, such as the construction of 
mosques, schools, and Muslim community centers. The sociological consequence of this 
community-bolstering philanthropy was that it provided a marginalized minority community a 
means of resisting oppressive state actions and stigmatizing public discourses, while at the same 
time becoming more deeply invested in American social and political structures.  
It could then be said that—in practice—U.S. Muslim philanthropy post-9/11 has 
maintained a productive tension between alienation and resistance on the one hand and 
assimilation and accommodation on the other. The diversification of U.S. Muslim philanthropic 
activity after 9/11 is partly the result of this tension, which has provided Muslims the 
sociopolitical space to act decisively and varyingly as U.S. citizens and Muslims. This resulting 
space between alienation and assimilation, and between resistance and accommodation, has 
allowed Muslims to integrate their individual and communal needs and religious values into a 
productive dialectical relationship with U.S. civic norms and political principles. The 
polyvalence of Muslim practices and the relative flexibility of interpretation that the Islamic 
tradition affords its adherents have enabled these dialectical relations, and they have, in turn, 
pushed U.S. Muslims into social relations of care with people of widely varied cultural, political, 
religious, and economic backgrounds. These various groups have not all agreed on what 
constitutes the greater good to which people should give. There is no doubt, for example, that 
despite their mutual engagement at various points, the state and U.S. Muslim relief organizations 
have not seen eye to eye. Nonetheless, giving, in and of itself, based on varying understandings 
of Islamic values has forged social relations that are shaping both U.S. Muslim religious 
identities and modes of communal belonging. According to a Muslim American civil engineer 
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working with the U.S. military’s U.S. Disaster Assistance Center during the 2005 Kashmir 
earthquake, 
One of the many rewarding parts of this trip was the coordination effort between 
the different groups of people in Pakistan. Everyone was there for the same 
reason—to help in whatever capacity they could. . . . For me, as a Muslim 
American (Pakistani), it was comforting to see the Pakistani and American 
military work hand in hand. . . . How ironic to feel such warmth and unity in the 
midst of such tremendous destruction and devastation.” (Khan, 2006) 
Focusing on the practice of philanthropy reveals both the diversity and the critical nature 
of American Muslims’ engagement with American society and politics. At the time of this 
writing, American Muslims are in alliances with social justice and civil rights organizations 
through financial support of organizations critical of U.S. policies and society, such as Black 
Lives Matter and the ACLU. There are also U.S. Muslims whose sizable donations to the two 
major U.S. political parties have provided individual Muslims access to political insiders. In the 
case of the Republican Party, it has even afforded individual U.S. Muslims meetings with figures 
like Donald Trump and Newt Gingrich who have promoted a ban on Muslim immigration and 
have advocated anti-Shari‘a legislation (“A Muslim at the RNC,” 2016). 
At a more organized level, in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina in 2005, several major 
Muslim relief organizations came together to form the Muslim Hurricane Relief Taskforce which 
pledged to raise $10 million for Katrina relief effort. At a time when U.S. Muslim charitable 
giving was under suspicion, they sought to shape a different relation with the state and the public 
through philanthropy. They touted the taskforce’s special “focus on financial transparency and 
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accountability as set forth in relevant government regulations and standards.” They also 
emphasized their relations to fellow Americans and the state as American citizens. The subtitle 
of a special report on Hurricane Katrina published in the most widely distributed American 
Muslim magazine of the time, Islamic Horizons, read, “Muslim Americans Rally to Help Fellow 
Citizens.” The Secretary General of the Islamic Society of North America told the American 
public, “It is a national and Islamic obligation to assist one’s neighbors when they are in need.” 
At a time when national Muslim organizations were dealing with the government shutdown of 
Muslim relief organizations, his statement evinced U.S. Muslim organizations’ awareness of how 
philanthropy forges relations between groups of varying political interests as well as between 
adherents of different religions. “Outside the mosque,” Islamic Horizons reported, “a Christian 
mission from Dallas arrives and pulls the doors of a supply truck open and offers medicines to 
the needy victims at the mosque. And so it goes, Christian shelters and Muslim shelters 
intermingle their support” (Islamic Horizons, 2005a, pp. 1–2, 4).  
The social relations that have been and can be forged through the dialectical tension that 
philanthropy maintains between resisting oppressive state practices and integrating into dominant 
sociopolitical structures is also evident in the work of the American Muslim Taskforce for 
Disaster Relief, which was formed in response to the devastating Kashmir earthquake of 2005. 
The work of this taskforce was also featured in a special report in Islamic Horizons, but its tone 
was expressly different. Rather than emphasizing national ties between citizens, the report 
emphasized religious ties between fellow Muslims as the report quoted the Prophet Muhammad 
saying, “Whoever relieves a believer of some of the distress of this world, God will relieve him 
of some of the distress of the Day of Resurrection.” Furthermore, rather than seeking a new 
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relationship with the government by emphasizing transparency and adherence to regulations, this 
report highlighted the opportunity U.S. relief efforts provide for the government to change its 
relations with people of a region who have been negatively affected by the George W. Bush 
administration’s “war on terror.” At a press conference held in Washington, DC, on October 12, 
2005, the “[Kashmir earthquake] taskforce called on President Bush to appoint an ad-hoc 
committee of U.S. governmental and American Muslim non-governmental relief agencies to 
offer coordinated relief to earthquake victims.” In a letter to the administration, the taskforce 
sought to drive home the point that through its relief efforts, the United States could form new 
relations with South Asian Muslims who have suffered adverse repercussions from the so-called 
“war on terror” and the U.S. invasion of Afghanistan. They argued, “Muslim humanitarian 
organizations know where the relief is needed the most and how it can be delivered in the most 
effective way. Hence, the partnership between the U.S. government and Muslim humanitarian 
organizations is vital to American interests. We are ready and willing to make the response to the 
South Asian earthquake disaster another shining example for America’s goodwill and 
compassion” (Islamic Horizons, 2005b, pp. 1–4, 6–10). 
Conclusion 
In contemporary American public discourse, Islam is generally conceptualized as a 
doctrinaire religion whose adherents stand uncomfortably in relationship to modernity, whereas 
modern religion is generally conceptualized as a system based on internal experiences of 
transcendence that help individuals meet any structural challenges they face in life. Within the 
realm of these presuppositions, political acts of violence carried out by militant Muslim 
organizations, such as al-Qaeda, are generally seen as a consequence of Islam’s incongruence 
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with the values and structures of modernity. Many government officials and members of the 
public at large thus look to Islamic doctrines for explanations of Muslims’ political acts of 
violence and for perceived solutions to the threat of terrorism. Such pathologizing approaches to 
Islam post-9/11 have focused on U.S. Muslim philanthropy as a possible source of funding for 
terrorism. The government’s investigation and closing of several American Muslim international 
relief organizations have, in turn, raised questions about state violations of U.S. Muslims’ 
constitutional right to practice zakat. Consequently, the public discourse on U.S. Muslim 
philanthropy post-9/11 has been framed by the perceived need to balance national security and 
religious liberty.  
U.S. Muslims’ actual philanthropic practices, however, contradict this framing of U.S. 
Muslim philanthropy. American Muslims, collectively, never stopped practicing zakat as a result 
of the actions the government took against the largest Muslim philanthropic organizations, nor 
have U.S. Muslim charities been shown to pose a threat to American national security. In 
contrast to general presumptions in U.S. public discourse about Islam’s rigidity and religion’s 
interiority, the actual practice of charity among U.S. Muslims highlights the polyvalence of Islam 
and the fluidity of the public practice of Islam. In the fluid space of practice, U.S. Muslims have 
brought Islamic vocabularies of charity and legal and sociopolitical norms regarding 
philanthropy in the United States into conversation with one another, and in doing so, they have 
forged and reconfigured relations across groups of varying social, religious, political, cultural, 
and economic backgrounds. In this process, they have shaped American Islam as multifarious 
and dynamic and have disclosed the profound variety of interpretations and motivations that 
underlie charitable giving in this country. 
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